Cajamar fined €2 million for remuneration: what banks must review

Key data

Cajamar will pay €2,000,000 in fines and its top executives will assume personal sanctions of between €40,000 and €75,000 for an irregularity in remuneration policy: failure to compute at least 15% of pension commitments of the identified collective as variable remuneration. The infraction is classified as serious under Article 93.t) of the Law 10/2014, on the organization, supervision and solvency of credit institutions.

The sanctioning resolution was issued in February 2025, but its publication in the BOE was delayed until 5 August 2026 after resolving a judicial precautionary incident regarding the publication itself. The proceedings had been initiated in May 2024.

What does this regulation establish?

Article 93.t) of Law 10/2014 requires credit institutions to ensure that, when designing their remuneration policy for the identified collective (employees whose professional activity has material impact on the entity's risk profile), they compute at least 15% of pension commitments within variable remuneration.

Cajamar did not apply this computation correctly, which the Bank of Spain classifies as a serious infraction. The regulation seeks to align remuneration incentives with prudent risk management: if pension commitments are not accounted for as variable remuneration, the entity may be artificially underestimating the weight of deferred and conditionally deferred compensation, evading the limits and controls that the law imposes.

The breakdown of sanctions imposed is as follows:

Economic and operational impact

Beyond the fine amount, the real impact of this resolution for the banking sector is twofold:

• Direct cost: €2,000,000 for the entity, plus personal sanctions for each board member and the Chief Executive Officer. The total amount far exceeds €2,000,000 when all individual sanctions are added together.
• Reputational and publicity cost: The resolution is published in the BOE with the names of the sanctioned parties. This has direct consequences on market perception, investors and customers.
• Personal responsibility of governance bodies: Board members are not mere supervisors: they respond economically on an individual basis. This requires boards of directors to actively involve themselves in the review and approval of remuneration policies.
• Supervisory signal: The Bank of Spain demonstrates that it reviews in detail the computation of pension commitments within variable remuneration of the identified collective, an area that many entities may be managing incorrectly.

Who does it affect?

• Spanish credit institutions subject to Law 10/2014: banks, savings banks, credit cooperatives and credit financial establishments.
• Board members and members of the board of directors of credit institutions: personal sanctions are a reality, not a theoretical threat.
• Chief Executive Officers and General Directors with responsibility for remuneration policy.
• Human Resources and Compensation managers in credit institutions managing remuneration of the identified collective.
• Compliance Officers and Internal Audit Directors responsible for verifying compliance with Article 93.t) of Law 10/2014.
• Legal advisors and consultants providing services to financial entities in corporate governance and remuneration matters.

Practical example

Suppose a medium-sized credit institution has an identified collective of 50 employees with pension commitments valued at €10,000,000. According to Article 93.t) of Law 10/2014, at least €1,500,000 (15%) must be computed as variable remuneration for that collective.

If the entity does not perform this computation—or does so incompletely, as happened in the Cajamar case—it is incurring the same serious infraction that has cost €2,000,000 to the entity and between €40,000 and €75,000 to each of its administrators and executives.

The Cajamar case demonstrates that the Bank of Spain not only sanctions the entity, but individualizes responsibility for each board member. A board member who has not reviewed or questioned the remuneration policy may face a personal sanction of tens of thousands of euros.

What should companies do now?

1. Review the remuneration policy of the identified collective: Verify that pension commitments of this collective are being computed correctly and that at least 15% appears as variable remuneration, as required by Article 93.t) of Law 10/2014.
2. Involve the board of directors: The personal responsibility of board members is real. The board must actively approve and supervise the remuneration policy, leaving documentary evidence of that control.
3. Audit the remuneration file of the identified collective: Commission an internal or external review that certifies compliance with the 15% computation before the supervisor detects it.
4. Update Compliance procedures: Include control of Article 93.t) in compliance plans and in periodic internal audit reports.
5. Document remuneration decisions: In case of inspection, the entity must be able to prove that the computation was performed correctly and that the board validated it. Lack of documentation worsens the entity's position with the supervisor.

Official source

Consult complete regulation in official source

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific decisions, consult a qualified professional. Source: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2026-17068